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Introduction 
This research purports to provide a phenomenological description of the way 
in which we experience time in order to pinpoint the forces that inherently 
drive our existence towards. The link between phenomenology and time could 
give rise to endless reflections, especially starting from Husserl’s standpoint 
(1969). Nonetheless, this research aims at investigating a specific facet of this 
topic, that is, the effort of steering one’s life through time. In so doing, the 
research leans on a wide range of philosophers who help us in pinpointing the 
forces we appeal to while endeavouring to steer our experience of time, i.e. our 
life through time. So, the methodological frame of this research is strictly 
phenomenological: from this viewpoint philosophers related to different 
philosophical traditions will be taken into account insofar as they radically 
shed light on those forces that constitute the core of our unremitting effort of 
steering our life through time. The way we experience time is akin to passing 
through an endless corridor: we always live in present moments and we always 
pass through present moments (cf. Husserl 1969), even if we constantly 
reach out towards the future and towards the past. We constantly move 
towards an effort of shaping the future and towards an effort of 
comprehending the past. We are sort of hedged in by this double endeavour 
and our experience of time flows into a relentless stream that inexorably 
points towards. This entails that the way we experience time is inescapably 
interwoven with a necessity of giving a direction to this movement towards. 
We are continuously called to steer our experience of time, to steer our life 
through time. Such a necessity brings to light a pivotal question: how can we 
steer our experience of time? That is to say, which forces can we rely on to 
drive our existence towards? Such questions lay the foundation for the 
current research, which aims at pinpointing the main forces we lean on to 
sustain our existence forwards and to steer our life through time. The research 
consists of four main sections. The first poses the question as to why 
phenomenology is to be deemed as a fruitful perspective whereby it is 
worth broaching the issue. The second points out how a relentless movement 
forwards characterizes our experience of time: within this frame, this second 
part combs through the nature of such a movement by appeal to the concepts 
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of natality and élan vital and examines those conditions that do not depend 
upon our choice or will but sharply define the frame where our experience of 
time is primarily set. The third part poses the question as to which forces we 
rely on while steering the present towards the future, that is to say, while 
trying to shape the future. The fourth section lingers over the other side of the 
coin: which forces do we rely on while steering the past towards the present, 
that is to say, while trying to comprehend the past? 
As a whole, the research will provide a phenomenological portrait of the forces 
that drive our existence towards. It argues that our experience of time is a 
multilayer experience whose prior root consists in a movement towards since 
we experience the past as pointed towards the present and the present as 
pointed towards the future. The way we experience time is inherently affected 
by an urge to move towards: such an urge turns into a double effort of steering 
the past towards the present (that is, comprehending the past) and the present 
towards the future (that is, shaping the future). 
1. Theoretical, Applicative and Performative Commitment 
Ensuing From Phenomenology: A Phenomenological Reflection 
Upon “the Experience of the Forces Underpinning our Existing 
Towards”
It is worth noticing that this research does not aim at investigating our 
experience of time. Indeed, it aims at investigating a specific facet of such 
experience, that it, the forces that nurture our effort of steering life through 
time. We could refer to this facet as “the experience of the forces underpinning 
our existing towards”. The philosophical remarks we could appeal to while 
broaching this issue are surely countless. The current paragraph aims at 
showing that phenomenological philosophy is a valuable approach to tackle 
the topic at issue. Such a point implies a further thesis that needs to be 
accounted for, i.e. the inherent possibility of relating phenomenology to this 
topic. 
So, the point is: why should we prefer phenomenology over other possible 
ways of broaching the topic of “the experience of the forces underpinning our 
existing towards”? How could a phenomenological approach meaningfully 
enrich our comprehension of this specific kind of experience? Is the 
application of phenomenological philosophy to this dimension of experience 
even possible and hopefully fruitful? Facing these questions seems to be an 
unavoidable requirement if we intend to give rise to an analysis concerning the 
link between phenomenology and “the experience of the forces underpinning 
our existing towards”. Dodging them would lay the foundation for a groundless 
research. 
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The key to answering such questions lies in comprehending what 
distinguishes phenomenology as a philosophical method1 of description and 
what makes possible and fruitful its application to different scopes and, 
specifically, to “the experience of the forces underpinning our existing 
towards”. Such a key seems to consist in the multilayer nature typical of a 
specific kind of philosophy stemming from phenomenology. The thrust of this 
thesis is that a particular kind of philosophy could be drawn from 
phenomenological philosophy itself. By appeal to a few issues typical of 
phenomenological philosophy, it is possible to develop a specific kind of 
philosophy whose first source is phenomenology itself. This inquiry is not a 
phenomenological study concerning “the experience of the forces 
underpinning our existing towards”. Phenomenology just offers valuable 
remarks useful for giving rise to a philosophical study concerning this 
experience: in this sense this inquiry is phenomenological, since it stems from 
some phenomenological issues. 
The phenomenological issues here at stake are the following (cf. Husserl 1976, 
2015): i) the prevalence of first-person perspective experiences as the 
unavoidable horizon and landmark for any philosophical inquiry: although 
this kind of experience consists of unique traits, it also exemplifies traits 
shared by others’ kindred experiences. Far from being completely solipsistic 
or totally sharable, first-person perspective experience is the inescapable 
horizon of any research that aims at clarifying the inherent structure of the 
world-of-life [Lebenswelt]; ii) the endeavour to identify the essential traits [das 
Wesen] of a given phenomenon and such traits should account for my own 
experiences as well as for others’ experiences; iii) the effort of shedding light 
on the nature of the phenomena surrounding us in the world-of-life, that is to 
say, the effort of bringing to light the structure of the world-of-life and, in so 
doing, phenomenalizing what we talk about; iv) the task of justification 
(Rechtfertigung), i.e. the task of accounting for. The first and the second issue 
refer to two sides of the same coin: the former is related to the problem of 
giveness and the second to the problem of knowledge. The former poses the 
question as to “how, and under what conditions, objects with a determinate 
sense of being so-and-so are at all given to consciousness” (De Warren 2009, 
12). The latter poses the question as to “what is such-and-such” (De Warren 
2009, 12). 
Definitively, phenomenology is not confined to these issues. Nonetheless, we 
could rely on them to give rise to a philosophical approach that is partly 
grounded in phenomenology. Within this frame, phenomenology is not to be 
confined to a method we could simply follow. Indeed, it is related to a 
multilayer commitment, i.e. a theoretical, applicative and performative 
1 The sense in which phenomenological philosophy could be regarded as a method will 
be clarified in the current paragraph. 
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commitment. Now, what is this triple commitment we could draw from 
phenomenology? 
In December 1927 Husserl wrote a letter to Roman Ingarden, one of his 
students he mostly grew fond of. A passage from it deserves to be quoted since 
Husserl draws our attention to the dynamic unfolding between two items, 
which could be named phenomenological issues and phenomenological ways. 
Husserl writes: “ich lasse mich von der Art der Wirkung meiner Druckwerke 
niederdru cken und davon, daß selbst die besseren Schu ler die angedeuteten 
Tiefen unbeachtet ließen und daß sie, statt meine Ansa tze zu vollenden, lieber 
immerzu eigene Wege gehen wollten” (Ingarden 1968, 42). Briefly, Husserl is 
complaining about his students’ scarce interest in examining the overriding 
phenomenological issues: they prefer to apply phenomenology to their own 
ways rather than examining these fundamental issues. Contrary to Husserl, 
these two options do not seem to rule each other out: it seems possible to 
explore new phenomenological ways and to comb through the fundamental 
phenomenological issues. Actually, the former depends upon the latter: an 
enduring examination of phenomenological bedrocks is a necessary condition 
to bring about new and consistent developments. 
Within this frame, phenomenological issues and phenomenological ways 
cannot be split. The primary nature of phenomenology consists in a method 
characterized by strict and clear issues, which refer to kind of methodological 
points we should appeal to in order to give rise to any kind of 
phenomenological study. In a complementary way, the other side of the coin of 
phenomenology’s nature consists in the disclosure of phenomenological ways 
of application. This means that, if we lean on phenomenological issues, then it 
is possible for us to disclose new ways of phenomenological applications, new 
ways of relating phenomenology to different kinds of experiences, scopes, 
phenomena, and so on and so forth. 
The appeal to issues and ways mirrors the double nature of phenomenology 
and the corresponding double commitment it requires, i.e. a theoretical and 
applicative one. Applying phenomenology means relating it to “something” — 
for example, the scope of aesthetic experiences, “the experience of the forces 
underpinning our existing towards”, or the topic of affectivity, of emotions, of 
habit, and whatsoever — and combing through its essence. Without specific 
phenomenological issues (theoretical commitment), this application could not 
take place. It is exactly this applicative nature of phenomenology that allows 
us to relate it to the scope of “the experience of the forces underpinning our 
existing towards” under the guidance of the four previous phenomenological 
issues. However, such an applicative turn calls for a closer look. 
In order to carry out any phenomenological application, in order to relate 
phenomenological issues to a specific dimension of inquiry, we are supposed 
to act: phenomenology does not merely call for a theoretical and applicative 
commitment. Indeed, it entails a strong performative commitment. It spurs 
us 
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to do something: in order to give rise to phenomenological reflections, we have 
to carry out the phenomenological reduction, to put the natural attitude into 
brackets, to vary the phenomena in their essential traits — according to the 
eidetic variation — to let the phenomenon catch our attention, and so on and 
so forth (cf. Husserl 1977, § 1-46). This kind of performativity, along with the 
theoretical (phenomenological issues) and applicative (phenomenological 
ways) nature, is the necessary condition to engage in phenomenological 
analyses to a great extent. No experience prevents us from grappling with it 
from a phenomenological standpoint. Theoretical, applicative and 
performative facets of phenomenology are the forces we appeal to while trying 
to bring to light the essential traits of the phenomena surrounding us in the 
world-of-life. It follows that phenomenology inherently demands to be related 
to the scope of our own personal experiences. Phenomenology is a 
philosophical method we should appeal to if we want to gain evidence and 
clarification with regard to the phenomena surrounding us in the world-of-life, 
included “the experience of the forces underpinning our existing towards”. 
Such an application is not for its own sake: it strives for an overarching 
comprehension of our being into the world. The phenomenological way we 
tread in order to gain evidence and clarification is not a philosophical way that 
merely resembles, for example, the Socratic endeavour or any other 
philosophical attempt that purports to achieve the same goal. 
Phenomenological method has been here related to specific issues that clearly 
tell it apart distinguishing it in a sound manner. 
So, every philosopher who deals with phenomenology is supposed to actively 
question herself and her certainties in order to carry out the chief 
phenomenological task, that is, the effort of comprehending the inner 
structure of the phenomena inhabiting the world of life under the guidance of 
the four issues just taken into account. These issues set the stage for the link 
between phenomenology and “the experience of the forces underpinning our 
existing towards”. The fruitfulness of such a nexus strictly depends upon the 
striking outcomes we can achieve following this phenomenological way. In 
fact, tackling this kind of experience from a phenomenological viewpoint 
entails the appeal to the previous four issues and, in so doing, it enables us to 
answer the following key questions: 1) which kind of movement characterizes 
our effort of steering our life through time? [§2]; 2) which forces do we rely on 
while steering the present towards the future, that is to say, while trying to 
shape the future? [§3]; 3) which forces do we rely on while steering the past 
towards the present, that is to say, while trying to comprehend the past? [§4]. 
2. An Unavoidable Frame Where a Relentless Movement
Forwards Plays Out
Life’s Forces That Sustain and Drive Our Existence Towards 
Nicolai Hartmann (1962) argues that every situation we face compels us to 
make a decision, to choose how to behave. There is no way out, we have to act 
and unavoidably decide how to act. Every situation assigns us a task we cannot 
dodge. Every situation forces us to face with the following overarching 
question: what do I have to do? Every time this question is renewed and our 
reply needs to be renewed as well. Every time the act implies the reply: the 
way we decide to act unavoidably mirrors the way we decided to respond to 
that situation. What raises valuable interest is that Hartmann urges us to 
become aware of the seriousness of such a prevailing question. There is no 
way out, we have to decide, we have to act. Deciding how to act means giving a 
direction to our being into the world (cf. Borgna 2015, Weinrich 2004). 
Such an account is a remarkable jumping-off point for this research since it 
brings into sharp profile our daily necessity of giving a direction, our daily 
effort of steering our life through time: our acting and our being into the world 
need to be steered. This research aims at arguing that this kind of necessity 
brings to light a multilayer temporal dynamic: every situation we face forces us 
to decide how to act and, consequently, how to steer the present towards the 
future and the past towards the present. An overarching movement forwards is 
at issue: from the past to present and from the present to the future. It seems 
that our effort of steering our life through time primarily consists in such a 
dynamic. 
How to comb it through? How to provide a phenomenological portrait of this 
multilayer dynamic? Furthermore, why does such a relentless movement 
forwards characterize our being into the world? We could answer such 
questions in many different ways and appeal to a wide spectrum of 
philosophical stances. Nevertheless, this research aims at providing a 
phenomenological description of this specific experience and so it aims at 
complying with the four previous issues. In this effort two notions turn out to 
be keystones that could significantly account for this multilayer temporal 
dynamic. The notions at stake are the following: élan vital, as Minkowski 
(1970, 1977) accounts for it, and natality, as Arendt (1958) describes it. 
2.1. Why do we move forwards? Élan vital and natality 
If we take stock of the so-called “experience of the forces underpinning our 
existing towards”, which traits could we deem as essential traits of this kind of 
experience? In the light of the second issue such traits should account for my 
own experience “of the forces underpinning my existing towards” as well as 
for others’ experiences “of the forces underpinning their existing towards”. 
Secondly, the identification of such traits should ensue from the effort of 
bringing to light the essential structure of the relentless movement forwards 
that resembles a specific facet of the way we experience time in the world-of-
life: in so doing, we should end up phenomenalizing what we talk about when 
talking about “the experience of the forces underpinning our existing 
towards” 
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(third issue). Thirdly, the task of justification (Rechtfertigung) plays a pivotal 
role since the attempt to account for this kind of experience is primarily at 
stake (fourth issue). Lastly, the prevalence of first-person perspective 
experience stands as an unavoidable horizon: in order to comprehend the 
“essence” of this peculiar experience, we have to start by appealing to our own 
first-person perspective experiences so as to draw from this pattern those 
traits that could account for others’ experiences too. So, what ties my 
“experience of the forces underpinning my existing towards” to the same kind 
of experience that others face? The notions of élan vital and natality are 
coordinates we could usefully appeal to while trying to achieve this goal. 
Under the guidance of Bergson’s (1907) thought, Minkowski argues that élan 
vital inherently characterizes human beings: we are constantly looking 
forwards. Naturally, this mode of being needs a counterpart since our living 
does not restrict itself to this movement forwards. Minkowski terms this 
counterpart “vital contact with reality”. These two items attune themselves to 
each other so that our looking forwards goes along with a sort of movement of 
slackening towards the environment. It is not a matter of an opposition: 
harmony and balance nourish such a linkage. Following Bleuler, Minkowski 
explains this pair by appeal to the terms “schizoidia” and “syntonia”. It is about 
the two fundamental principles of life: syntonia enables us to attune ourselves 
to the environment, schizoida enables us to drift away from the environment. 
These principles are not opposite forces. We strive for their harmony: in the 
wake of syntonia, we try to attune ourselves to the environment; in the wake 
of schizoidia, we try to leave a mark through our own actions. We do not 
restrict ourselves to soak into reality, we also strive to point beyond it. Even 
we do not restrict ourselves to point beyond reality, we also try to soak into it. 
These forces give rise to a balance that is definitively necessary for a non-
pathological life. So, we could surmise that élan vital is a coordinate we appeal 
to when trying to understand what inherently spurs us forwards. Élan vital is a 
trait of human nature responsible for this movement forwards. 
Now, if we link this notion to the concept of natality — as Arendt devised it 
(1958) — we could draw a further conclusion. In fact, if we put these two 
concepts on the same footing, a sharper picture of this movement forwards 
stands out. Like the concept of élan vital, natality too does not explain the root 
of such movement. Indeed, it lingers over its nature and so helps us in better 
understanding it: natality refers to our ability to yield new possibilities and 
mark the beginning of something new. It inherently turns to our ability to give 
rise to newness. Arendt clearly points out: 
The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry 
everything human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the 
faculty of interrupting it and beginning something new, a faculty 
which is inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that 
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men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in 
order to begin (Arendt 1958, 246). 
In the light of Minkowski’s and Arendt’s remarks, it seems to follow that 
natality and élan vital could be deemed as two sides of the same coin. Both of 
them are coordinates useful for explaining and clarifying the innermost nature 
of the movement forwards that is responsible for our effort of steering our 
experience of time forwards: the past towards the present and the present 
towards the future. 
Before examining the forces we rely on to carry out this double and sole 
movement (§3), it is worth dwelling upon the constraints that sway over the 
necessity of steering our acting and being into the world. Such constraints too 
are pivotal coordinates we rely on in the effort of providing a 
phenomenological account of the way in which we constantly experience and 
face with this movement forwards. 
2.2. Those accidents that cannot be dodged 
Which are the boundaries that inescapably hold a sway over the effort of 
steering our existence forwards? In order to answer this question, we could 
significantly turn to two philosophers who provide insightful remarks relevant 
to the question we are treating: which essential traits characterize the 
relentless movement forwards that resembles a specific facet of the way we 
experience time? If we appeal to a few remarks of Spiegelberg (1986) and 
Scheler (1914-1916) we come to shed light on these traits. 
Spiegelberg leads us to tackle a crucial divide between those conditions that 
depend upon our acting and those that are completely independent of us and 
pretty random. Spiegelberg coins the expression “accidents of birth” in order 
to mark off these circumstances: 
Accident of birth might be defined as any circumstance in a 
person’s congenital condition not based upon principles of just 
distribution such as desert or guilt. It is accidental in the sense 
that there is no “necessary”, morally justifiable connection 
between our actual condition at birth and our moral claims 
(Spiegelberg 1986, 123). 
Accidents of birth make every human being equally powerless before this 
randomness: «in the fate of being blindly subject to the unequal chances of our 
unequal births we are all equals» (Spiegelberg 1986, 145). The unavoidability 
and randomness of accidents of birth call for acknowledgment and redress in 
the sake of equality (Spiegelberg 1986, 142-143). This concept proposed by 
Spiegelberg could be meaningfully enriched by the account that Scheler 
provides with regard to the dynamic between fate and destination. Scheler’s 
account seems to enrich Spiegelberg’s one since it clarifies how individuality is 
related to accidents of birth. If we tether these two stances one to the other 
and read the former in the light of the latter and vice versa, we find ourselves 
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equipped with another crucial coordinate useful for our phenomenological 
aim. So, why should we endorse Scheler’s claims? 
Scheler distinguishes “fate” (Schicksal) from “destination” (individuelle 
Bestimmung). The former is related to those circumstances that cannot be 
regarded as outcomes of desert or guilt. Whereas the latter is related to the 
core of the individuality of each person, namely to the ethos of each person, i.e. 
to the axiological hierarchy shaped by one’s own “individual vocation” (Scheler 
1973, 489-494). What matters mostly is how Scheler links together these two 
concepts. According to him, we should recognize fate as an incontrovertible 
bedrock and lean on such awareness to spot it and then choose whether to let 
us be crushed by it or hold out against it. Within this frame, freedom turns into 
a dynamic between fate and destination. In Ordo Amoris, Scheler tackles this 
linkage and maintains that fate cannot embrace everything that does not 
depend upon us since every single event that happens to us becomes an 
inherent part of our life, just because it happened to us. So, every single event 
acquires a specific meaning within the frame of every person’s life. Thus, fate 
embraces everything happening to us, regardless of their randomness. Once 
that something occurred, it is unavoidably tied to the core of our own 
individuality. Persons’ freedom takes shape thanks to this essential nexus 
between fate and destination. So, Scheler’s account seems to be more 
comprehensive than Spiegelberg’s since it covers the link between 
individuality and fate, as well as and besides the recognition of fate itself. The 
distinction of accidents of birth from circumstances we can alter by our own 
actions is a fundamental step in order to grasp the compass of the starting 
question “What do I have to do?”. 
Thus, these remarks lead us to draw a clearer picture of the relentless 
movement forwards that resembles a specific facet of the way we experience 
time. In the light of these starting outcomes we could argue for the following 
thesis: each of us lives in the present while living the present. This means that 
in addition of being sunk into circumstances that depend neither upon our will 
nor choice (i.e. accidents of birth and fate), in addition of living in the present, 
we live the present by steering it forwards. An unremitting vector forwards 
defines the way we experience time: in addition of living in the present, we live 
the present, that is to say, we steer our life through time by appeal to forces that 
sustain and drive our existence towards. 
Which are these forces? We will be able to spot such forces only on condition 
that we grasp the components of this vector forwards. Following paragraphs 
will analyse it and argue that it consists of a double movement: steering the 
present towards the future (§3) and steering the past towards the present 
(§4). Both these movements flow into a sole movement forwards that defines
the whole way we experience time.
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3. Steering the Present Towards the Future: An Effort of Shaping
Every situation we face forces us to decide how to act and this choice 
definitively leaves a mark, which remains then etched in who we are and what 
we do. We are inherently impelled to shape the future in the light of our own 
individuality, projects and wishes: this endless drive turns into a movement 
forwards, that is to say, an endeavour to steer the present towards the future. 
This issue leads us to wonder which forces we can rely on to carry out such a 
task. In order identify these forces, two philosophical accounts turn out to be 
relevant to the topic and helpful for tackling it. Arendt’s stance on imagination 
(1958) and Scheler’s stance on maturity (1973) constitute sort of coordinates 
we could rely upon in order to fully grasp the nature of those forces that allow 
us to steer the present towards the future. 
Which forces do we appeal to while endeavouring to shape the future in 
accordance with our current projects and wishes? Two main forces seem to be 
at stake, i.e. maturity and imagination. This proposal does not intend to 
restrict the wide spectrum of the forces we could rely on to these two sole 
coordinates — maturity and imagination. This proposal aims at regarding 
these two as fundamental keystones within the wide spectrum of the forces we 
could rely upon while shaping the future. 
3.1. How to steer the present towards the future? Maturity and imagination 
In Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik Scheler provides 
an insightful portrait of maturity [Reifung]. 
The being-able-to-do only selectively acts on the originally given 
content of willing, with the result that a great deal of the 
originally willed content is no longer “willed” and its realization is 
“renounced” […] A primary phenomenon of all psychic maturity is 
to be seen, for instance, in the continuous restriction of willing to 
the sphere of the “being-able-to-do” […] This differentiation takes 
place at the “threshold” of what “can be done” and is accompanied 
by a continuous restriction of objectives (Scheler 1973, 125-126). 
According to Scheler, maturity consists in finding a linkage between what one 
strives for and what one can actually do. Possible contents of willing need to 
be hedged in by possible contents of acting. Maturity fastens contents of the 
will to the steady reality. It is the ability to become aware of the gap occurring 
between these two items: 
The more primitive man is, the more he believes himself capable 
of anything by mere willing […] From the original volitional aims,  
“possible” ones are only gradually filtered, and within this sphere 
of what can be done there is again a gradual filtration of what can 
be realized through this or that kind of acting […] Experience is 
[…] negative and selective within the span of original volitional 
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contents determined by the contents of specific value-qualities 
(Scheler 1973, 126). 
At first blush, such an account seems really partial: we would not endorse the 
claim that, while trying to shape the future, we merely appeal to this sort of 
prudential ability (cf. Smith 1759), which enables us to shrink the contents of 
the will in the light of the boundaries of reality. If we heed the dimension of 
our experiences, we would claim that, while steering the present towards the 
future, we appeal to another force that enables us to enlarge and stretch the 
horizons of our acting and willing rather than shrinking them: we appeal to 
imagination. What instance of imagination is here at stake? 
Maturity turned out to be a force underpinning our existence towards. 
Nonetheless, maturity seems to call for another force that enables us freely 
imagine possibilities rather than strictly tether them to reality. Now, the topic 
of imagination could be philosophically treated from many different 
perspectives and this is not the place to tackle them. What matters here is that 
two specific instances of imagination seem to be deeply tethered to those 
forces that constitute the basis of our effort of shaping the future. Hannah 
Arendt’s and Edward De Bono’s stance on imagination enable us to spot 
another coordinate that flows into the phenomenological portrait we are 
devising. Despite their differences, these two standpoints bring into sharp 
profile meaningful features of imagination so as to highlight a few traits that 
usually stay on the sidelines. Arendt tackles imagination as the force that 
provides us with an enlarged mentality; De Bono tackles imagination as the 
force that provides us with a lateral thinking. Both these facets shed light on 
the pivotal role that imagination plays as a force we rely on to steer the 
present towards the future. 
Now, the enlarged mentality Arendt refers to is inherently linked with the 
representative nature that she ascribes to the political thought. Imagination is 
the ability to enlarge my mentality so as to embrace others in my process of 
decision-making. Imagination is the ability to render present those who are 
absent and, in so doing, one frees oneself from private interests and comes to 
be able to judge: 
Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by 
considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making 
present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that 
is, I represent them. This process of representation does not 
blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else 
[…] this is a question neither of empathy […] but of being and 
thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more 
people’s standpoints I have present in my mind while I am 
pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would 
feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my 
capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final 
conclusions, my opinion. It is this capacity for an “enlarged 
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mentality” that enables men to judge […] the only condition for 
this exertion of the imagination is disinterestedness, the 
liberation from one’s own private interests (Arendt 1968a, 303).  
A breakthrough proceeds from this reappraisal of imagination, which does not 
end up being confined to a mere fictional sphere detached from reality. Indeed, 
imagination definitively imbues reality. Opinion-forming and ability to judge 
depend upon imagination since it enables us to render present those who are 
absent. 
Imagination alone enables us to see things in their proper 
perspective, to be strong enough to put that which is too close at 
a certain distance so that we can see and understand it without 
bias and prejudice, to be generous enough to bridge abysses of 
remoteness until we can see and understand everything that is 
too far away from us as though it were our own affair. This 
distancing of some things and bridging the abysses to others is 
part of the dialogue of understanding, for whose purposes direct 
experience establishes too close a contact and mere knowledge 
erects artificial barriers […] This kind of imagination […] is the 
only inner compass we have (Arendt 1994, 323). 
Arendt’s stance brings out the compass of imagination as a force we rely on to 
steer the present towards the future. When deciding how to act, we are called 
to avail ourselves of imagination, that is to say, we are called to encompass 
others in the process of opinion-forming and judgment (cf. Arendt 1982). By 
appeal to imagination, we succeed in detaching ourselves from ourselves and 
getting closer to those who are far or even absent. Arendt highlights how 
imagination is a force useful for steering actions, orienting oneself in the 
world, making decisions. It is not a force that merely pushes us away from the 
world. It is a force that helps us in giving a direction to our acting and being 
into the world: it concretely helps us in shaping the future. 
Such a point could be fruitfully enriched through De Bono’s remarks on the 
matter. Like Arendt, this thinker too stretches the meaning usually ascribed to 
imagination, which turns out to be inherently linked with creativity and 
“lateral thinking” (De Bono 1993). What raises valuable interest is that, 
through De Bono’s remarks, a further force we rely on to steer the present 
towards the future stands out. It is always about imagination, but he sheds 
light on overshadowed facets of this ability. Actually, he deals with creativity 
and “lateral thinking” rather than imagination itself: this research argues for a 
stretching of De Bono’s account so that we could become able to grasp another 
facet of imagination’s compass. Thanks to his stance, imagination turns out to 
be an instance of lateral thinking and, moreover, a force we rely on to shape 
the future. According to De Bono, lateral thinking and creativity enable us 
grasp a new way of looking at the world: 
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Vertical thinking is concerned with proving or developing concept 
patterns. Lateral thinking is concerned with restructuring such 
patterns (insight) and provoking new ones (creativity). Lateral 
and vertical thinking are complementary. Skill in both is 
necessary […] Insight and humour both involve the restructuring 
of patterns. Creativity also involves restructuring but with more 
emphasis on the escape from restricting patterns. Lateral 
thinking involves restructuring, escape and the provocation of 
new patterns. Lateral thinking is closely related to creativity. But 
whereas creativity is too often only the description of a result, 
lateral thinking is the description of a process. One can only 
admire a result but one can learn to use a process. There is about 
creativity a mystique of talent and intangibles […] In order to be 
able to use creativity one must rid it of this aura of mystique and 
regard it as a way of using the mind as a way of handling 
information. This is what lateral thinking is about (De Bono 1990, 
7, 9). 
Lateral thinking allows us to escape traditional patterns and adopt 
revolutionary ones. This kind of thinking is based upon provocative tools that 
aim at bringing about new ideas and patterns. It aims at viewing problems in a 
new and unusual light so as to solve them by an indirect and creative 
approach. 
Lateral thinking seems to be a remarkable force we appeal to while trying to 
shape the future, while giving rise to that movement forwards typical of 
human nature. In order to shape the future, to carry out one’s own projects, 
lateral thinking turns out to be of paramount concern: it enables us to look at 
the world in a radically different way, to stretch our usual horizons. We 
temporarily reorchestrate our traditional patterns of inhabiting the world so 
as to devise new ways of looking at the world. This specific ability seems to 
balance the firmness typical of maturity. 
Hence, as a whole, we could surmise that our daily endeavour to steer the 
present towards the future is mainly based on three forces that reciprocally 
sway one over the other: imagination as ability to judge, maturity as ability to 
fasten the contents of the will to the possibilities of reality, imagination as 
ability to escape traditional patterns of thinking. Such forces do no prevent 
other forces from coming into play: nonetheless, this research argues that they 
are pivotal keystones that nurture our effort of steering the present towards 
the future by shaping the future itself. So, by appeal to these three main forces 
we are able to steer the present towards the future. 
Now, if we heed the dimension of experience, we could realize how the 
counterpart of such movement consists in steering the past towards the 
present since past itself needs to become inherent part of this movement 
forwards. Which forces do we appeal to while endeavouring to steer the past 
towards the present so as to comprehend the past itself by rendering it an 
inherent part of our constant movement forwards? Our effort of shaping the 
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future is not enough: we constantly strive for a comprehension of the past. 
How can we attain such a comprehension? 
4. Steering the Past Towards the Present: An Effort of 
Comprehension
Previous paragraphs have shown that the experience of present entails a 
multilayer experience of time, i.e. experiencing the present as pointed towards 
future and experiencing the past as pointed towards present. We strive to 
shape the future and to comprehend the past. These two aspects are two sides 
of the same coin, two sides of the same movement forwards. The effort of 
comprehending the past and the effort of shaping the future are parts of the 
same movement forwards (whose innermost nature élan vital and natality 
explained). The former flows into the latter and they strictly depend one upon 
the other: we cannot mark any clear boundary between them. In fact, the 
effort of comprehending the past cannot be confined to past itself. It is an 
effort of comprehension that contributes to sustain and drive our existence 
towards. Again, it is a matter of a movement forwards since the effort of 
comprehending the past moves towards the present. It is not a movement 
backwards. Indeed, it keeps on being a movement forwards. Mastering this 
whole movement forwards requires specific forces to rely on: maturity and 
imagination mainly help us in steering the present towards the future. What 
about steering the past towards the present? 
First of all, it is worth wondering what kind of comprehension is here at stake. 
This research takes into account a double meaning of the verb “to 
comprehend”. On the one hand, we try to comprehend the past in the sense 
that we try to understand it. On the other hand, we try to comprehend the past 
in the sense that we try to encompass it into the present, to create a steady 
continuity between our past and our present. If such a continuity collapsed, 
then no thread would tie one’s past to one’s present. If so, there would be no 
possibility that one succeed in mastering one’s past and, consequently, in 
nurturing one’s own personal individuality. Under the guidance of this double 
meaning, which forces enable us to comprehend the past so as to nurture this 
unremitting movement forwards? 
4.1. How to steer the past towards the present? Repentance and narration 
Which forces do we rely on to encompass the past and understand it? It seems 
that two forces are mainly at stake: repentance enables us to encompass the 
past and narration enables us to understand the past. These two forces are 
inherently intertwined one with the other as well as with the forces implied by 
the effort of shaping the future (i.e. maturity and imagination). 
Arendt’s stance on discourse (1958) and Scheler’s stance on repentance 
(2010) constitute those coordinates we could rely upon in order to fully grasp 
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the nature of those forces that allow us to steer the past towards the present. 
Which forces do we appeal to while endeavouring to comprehend the past in 
the light of our current life? Two main forces seem to be at stake, i.e. narration 
and repentance. Again, this proposal does not intend to restrict the wide 
spectrum of the forces we could rely on to these two sole coordinates — 
narration and repentance. This proposal aims at regarding these two as 
fundamental keystones within the wide spectrum of the forces we could rely on 
while comprehending the past. 
So, why repentance? This research does not deal with the religious meaning of 
this force. Scheler significantly makes a distinction between the role that 
repentance plays in religious experiences and its role in experiences that are 
not linked with any religious meaning. Anyway, these two instances of 
repentance share a common root that defines the innermost nature of 
repentance itself. In order to grasp this root, let us pay attention to Scheler’s 
remark about repentance: 
[Repentance] is a form of self-healing of the soul, is in fact its only 
way of regaining its lost powers. And in religion it is something yet 
more: it is the natural function with which God endowed the soul, in 
order that the soul might return to him whenever it strayed for him. 
(Scheler 2010, 39) 
And then he specifies: 
We are not the disposers merely of our future; there is also no 
part of our past life which […] might not still be genuinely altered 
in its meaning and worth, through entering our life’s total 
significance as a constituent of the self-revision which is always 
possible […] It is not repented but only unrepented guilt that 
holds the power to bind and determine the future. Repentance 
kills the life-nerve of guilt’s action and continuance. It drives 
motive and deed […] out of the living centre of the Self, and 
thereby enables life to begin […] a new course springing forth 
from the centre of the personality which, by virtue of the act of 
repentance, is no longer in bonds (Scheler 2010, 40). 
If we lean on these remarks, we could claim that Scheler argues for repentance 
as a force we rely on to give rise to a new start, to endlessly renew ourselves.  
Moreover, Scheler specifies how the compass of repentance is even broader if 
it were related to the (Catholic Christian) religious field: it is no more us who 
give rise to this newness, it is God who enables us to give rise to this newness. 
Without this possibility, when we drift away from God, we would be detached 
from Him once and for all. 
According to Scheler (1904-1916), repentance turns to the possibilities that 
nourish persons’ individuality and demands a radical conversion. Repentance 
carries out a rebirth that is grounded in such a conversion, a rebirth that frees 
from what one did or who one was. This means that repentance carries out a 
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continuous rebirth that frees from the past and is constrained by a pledge 
pointed towards the future. Repentance is a force that undoes. Such a power 
ensues from an actual conversion, from an affective restoration and 
reorganization of the axiological order typical of the personal sensitivity. 
If we try to enrich these Schelerian remarks and partly go beyond them, we 
could claim that repentance is a force that allows us to see past in a new light: 
without the possibilities yielded by repentance, persons would be suck into 
their past. Again, we are not claiming that repentance is the sole force that 
could play such a pivotal role: it is a fundamental keystone within the wide 
spectrum of the forces we could rely on while comprehending the past. It is a 
coordinate we could significantly avail ourselves of when trying to identify the 
main forces that enable us to comprehend the past. 
So, starting from Scheler’s stance and enriching it, repentance could be 
deemed as availability to personal reorchestration: it is the availability to 
reorchestrate oneself. Without this possibility, one would be trapped into her 
past: what she did and who she was would not be changeable. Indeed, 
repentance provides us with this astounding chance. In so doing, repentance 
turns out to be a force to rely on to steer the past towards the present. 
Repentance allows us to comprehend the past since we become able to 
encompass it into the present. This occurs since the radical personal upheaval 
that repentance brings about (and ensues from) enables the person not to be 
hedged in by the past and, consequently, to carry out a continuity between 
past, present and future. The possibility of rebirth and change repentance 
brims with brings out our inmost ability to hold sway over the past as well as 
over the future. Naturally, we cannot alter the contents of the past. Indeed, we 
can sway the meaning and sense of past and, in so doing, we could encompass 
the past into the present, that is, we could steer the past towards the present. 
Thus, our effort of comprehending the past finds in repentance a fundamental 
keystone: repentance enables us to encompass the past into the present. What 
about our effort of understanding the past in the light of the present? Which 
force enables us to comprehend the past in the sense that we become able to 
understand it in the light of the present? Which force could we appeal to when 
trying to understand the past? Arendt’s remarks turn out to be meaningful 
again. Thanks to them, it is possible to pinpoint this force, to spot another 
coordinate useful for devising a phenomenological portrait of the forces 
underpinning our existing towards. 
By virtue of Arendt’s pointers about narration and discourse, we have reasons 
for deeming narration as the force we are searching for. This does not mean 
that narration is the sole force we rely on when trying to comprehend the past. 
Indeed, this thesis simply entails that narration plays a pivotal and essential 
role in such a process of comprehension. Narration, as well as repentance, is a 
fundamental keystone within the wide range of the forces we could rely 
on 
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while comprehending the past. So, why is it worth endorsing Arendt’s stance 
on narration? 
Arendt maintains that human comprehension has to come to grips with 
bridgeless limits. Comprehension as understanding is neither a claim nor a 
right. It is just an effort and an attempt. Our endeavour to comprehend cannot 
be extended to everything that happened in the past. Arendt specifies how 
comprehension is restricted and we have to accept its limits. This awareness 
raises two questions: what makes comprehension possible? How to broach the 
past when comprehension seems groundless? Narration is a pivotal bedrock of 
the endeavour to understand the past: 
How difficult it must be to find a reasonable attitude is perhaps 
more clearly expressed by the cliché that the past is still 
“unmastered” and in the conviction held particularly by men of 
good will that the first thing to be done is to set about “mastering” 
it. Perhaps that cannot be done with any past, but certainly not 
with the past of Hitler Germany. The best that can be achieved is 
to know precisely what it was, and to endure this knowledge, and 
then to wait and see what comes of knowing and enduring […] 
The meaning of a committed act is revealed only when the action 
itself has come to an end and become a story susceptible to 
narration. Insofar as any “mastering” of the past is possible, it 
consists in relating what has happened; but such narration, too, 
which shapes history, solves no problems and assuages no 
suffering; it does not master anything once and for all. Rather, as 
long as the meaning of the events remains alive […] “mastering of 
the past” can take the form of ever-recurrent narration […] We 
too have the need to recall the significant events in our own lives 
by relating them to ourselves and others (Arendt 1968b, 20, 21). 
Narration is an endless task we are called to fulfil in order to humanize the 
world we live in. This thesis could to be enriched by a reference to the 
following remark that Arendt devises with regard to the essence of discourse: 
For the world is not humane just because it is made by human 
beings, and it does not become humane just because the human 
voice sounds in it, but only when it has become the object of 
discourse. However much we are affected by the things of the 
world, however deeply they may stir and stimulate us, they 
become human for us only when we can discuss them with our 
fellows. […] We humanize what is going on in the world and in 
ourselves only by speaking of it, and in the course of speaking of 
it we learn to be human (Arendt 1968b, 24-25). 
The process of understanding the past surely incurs limits: how to deal with 
past when comprehension seems no more possible? In such cases, Arendt 
maintains that becoming aware of human natality turns out to be the sole way 
to broach the past: «men, though they must die, are not born in order to die 
but in order to begin» (Arendt 1958, 246). The astounding human faculty of 
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giving rise to newness is what we can appeal to when failing to comprehend 
the past since we face historic events we can neither understand nor explain: 
Even though we have lost yardsticks by which to measure, and 
rules under which to subsume the particular, a being whose 
essence is beginning may have enough of origin within himself to 
understand without preconceived categories and to judge without 
the set of customary rules which is morality (Arendt 1994, 321). 
Concluding Remarks 
A relentless movement forwards characterizes our experience of time. We are 
called to give a direction to such a movement and this task consists in a double 
effort. On the one hand, we steer the past towards the present mainly by 
appeal to repentance and narration: the former enables us to encompass the 
past into the present, the latter enables us to understand the past. On the 
other hand, we steer the present towards the future mainly by appeal to 
maturity and imagination: the former enables us to fasten the will to reality, 
the latter enables us to look at reality in a creative and representative way. 
Within this frame, natality and élan vital are landmarks useful for grasping the 
nature of this overarching movement forwards: we constantly move forwards, 
even when we turn towards the past. 
This proposal does not intend to restrict the wide spectrum of the forces we 
could rely on to these sole coordinates—maturity and imagination, repentance 
and narration. This proposal aims at regarding these as fundamental keystones 
within the wide range of the forces we could rely upon while shaping the 
future and comprehending the past. We could appeal to other forces in 
addition to these, but it seems we could not succeed in shaping the future and 
comprehending the past if we do not appeal to such forces. 
This research attempted to identify those coordinates useful for providing a 
phenomenological description of the effort of steering one’s life through time 
and, subsequently, of the forces underpinning our existing towards. We are 
called to give a direction to the relentless movement forwards we constantly 
experience: maturity, imagination, repentance and narration are forces helpful 
in facing with the inescapable task of steering our experience of time. Tacking 
stock of such forces is the key to the fulfilment of the task that our being into 
the world makes us face with: instead of being numbly dragged by a relentless 
movement forwards, we strive to steer it by comprehending the past and 
shaping the future. This endeavour and the corresponding movement 
underpinning it inherently define our being into the world. 
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Life’s Forces That Sustain and Drive Our Existence Towards. 
Efforts of Steering One’s Life Through Time 
Abstract. We always live in the present and we always pass through 
the present, even if we constantly reach out towards the future and towards 
the past. We move towards an effort of shaping the future and towards an 
effort of comprehending the past. Our experience of time flows into a 
relentless stream that inexorably points towards. This entails that the way we 
experience time is inescapably interwoven with a necessity of giving a 
direction to this movement towards. Such a necessity brings to light two 
pivotal questions: how to describe such a relentless movement forwards? 
Which forces can we rely on to drive our existence towards? This research 
aims at pinpointing such forces and, in so doing, outlining a 
phenomenological picture of our multilayer experience of time. 
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narration, “the experience of the forces underpinning our existing towards” 
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